The hidden weighted bit function (HWBF), introduced by R. Bryant in IEEE Trans. Comp. 40 and revisited by D. Knuth in Vol. 4 of The Art of Computer Programming, is a function that seems to be the simplest one with exponential Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) size. This property is interesting from a cryptographic viewpoint since BDDbased attacks are receiving more attention in the cryptographic community. But, to be usable in stream ciphers, the functions must also satisfy all the other main criteria. In this paper, we investigate the cryptographic properties of the HWBF and prove that it is balanced, with optimum algebraic degree and satisfies the strict avalanche criterion. We calculate its exact nonlinearity and give a lower bound on its algebraic immunity. Moreover, we investigate its normality and its resistance against fast algebraic attacks. The HWBF is simple, can be implemented efficiently, has a high BDD size and rather good cryptographic properties, if we take into account that its number of variables can be much larger than for other functions with the same implementation efficiency. Therefore, the HWBF is a good candidate for being used in real ciphers. Indeed, contrary to the case of symmetric functions, which allow such fast implementation but also offer to the attacker some specific possibilities due to their symmetry, its structure is not suspected to be related to such dedicated attacks.
Introduction
To resist the main known attacks, Boolean functions used in stream ciphers should have good cryptographic properties: balancedness, high algebraic degree, high algebraic immunity, high nonlinearity and good immunity to fast algebraic attacks. Up to now, many classes of Boolean functions with high algebraic immunity have been introduced [1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 14, 22, 23, 28, 29, 30, 31, 36, 37, 38, 41, 42, 43] . However, most of them do not satisfy all the necessary criteria and the few classes which do satisfy, are not very efficiently implementable; moreover, none of the papers studying these classes took BDD-based attacks into consideration.
BDD-based attacks were first introduced by Krause in 2002 [20] . They might be efficient against LFSR-based generators [20, 21, 34, 35] . To resist BDD-based attacks, a Boolean function should have a high BDD size.
The hidden weighted bit function (HWBF) was proposed by Bryant [2] . It is an easily defined function that has an exponential BDD size, but has a VLSI implementation with low area-time complexity [2] . In [19] , Knuth reproved Bryant's theorem stating that the HWBF has a large BDD size, regardless of how one reorders its variables. Therefore, the HWBF can resist BDD-based attacks and could be implemented efficiently. However, many other cryptographic properties of the HWBF were still unknown.
In this paper, we investigate the important cryptographic properties of this function and show that it is balanced, with optimum algebraic degree and satisfies the strict avalanche criterion. We calculate exactly its nonlinearity and give a lower bound on its algebraic immunity. These two parameters are not at an optimal level (but they are not low either). The function would then not be a good choice as a filter function (in a stream cipher) if it was implemented with a number of variables which is usual for other functions such as the Carlet-Feng function [7] (say, between 16 and 20 variables). But its very simple structure allows using it with many more variables (at least twice) and then the values of the nonlinearity and of the algebraic immunity allow good resistance to the main attacks while the function has still a much faster hardware implementation, which allows the stream cipher to be in the same time robust against the main known attacks and fast. This is also the case of some symmetric functions (whose output depend only on the Hamming weight of the input), but the specificity of symmetric functions represents a threat since it has the reputation of allowing dedicated attacks. The structure of the HWBF function is almost as simple as that of symmetric functions but the fact that, for a given Hamming weight different from 0 and n of the input, the output is non-constant (and is even almost balanced in the case of Hamming weights near n/2, that is, for most probable ones), the function represents a better tradeoff between robustness and speed. We also investigate the normality and give some computational results on the resistance of the HWBF against fast algebraic attacks, revealing that the HWBF displays good behavior against fast algebraic attacks.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the necessary background is established. We then investigate the cryptographic properties of the HWBF in Section 3. We end in Section 4 with conclusions.
Preliminaries
Let F n 2 be the n-dimensional vector space over the finite field F 2 . We denote by B n the set of all n-variable Boolean functions, from F n 2 into F 2 . Cosets of vector subspaces are also called flats. Let f ∈ B n and E be any flat. If the restriction of f to E, denoted by f | E , is constant (respectively affine), then E is called a constant (respectively affine) flat for f .
Any Boolean function f ∈ B n can be uniquely represented as a multivariate polynomial in
which is called its algebraic normal form (ANF). The algebraic degree of f , denoted by deg(f ), is the number of variables in the highest order term with nonzero coefficient.
A Boolean function is affine if there exists no term of degree strictly greater than 1 in the ANF. The set of all affine functions is denoted by A n . Let
|f (x) = 0}, be the support of a Boolean function f , respectively, its complement. The cardinality of 1 f is called the Hamming weight of f , and will be denoted by wt(f ). The Hamming distance between two functions f and g is the Hamming weight of f + g, and will be denoted by d(f, g). We say that an n-variable Boolean function f is balanced if wt(f ) = 2 n−1 .
Let f ∈ B n . The nonlinearity of f is its distance from the set of all n-variable affine functions, that is,
The nonlinearity of an n-variable Boolean function is bounded above by 2 n−1 − 2 n/2−1 , and a function is said to be bent if it achieves this bound. Clearly, bent functions exist only for even n and it is known that the algebraic degree of a bent function is bounded above by n 2 [4, 33] . The r-order nonlinearity, denoted by nl r (f ), is its distance from the set of all n-variable functions of algebraic degrees at most r.
A Boolean function f ∈ B n is called k-normal (respectively, k-weakly-normal) if there exist a k-dimensional constant (respectively, affine) flat for f . If k = n 2 , f is simply called a normal (respectively, weakly-normal) function.
For any f ∈ B n , a nonzero function g ∈ B n is called an annihilator of f if f g (the function defined by f g(x) = f (x)g(x)) is null, and the algebraic immunity of f , denoted by AI(f ), is the minimum value of d such that f or f + 1 admits an annihilator of degree d [25] . It is known that the algebraic immunity of an n-variable Boolean function is bounded above by n 2 [11] . To resist algebraic attacks, a Boolean function f should have a high algebraic immunity, which implies that the nonlinearity of f is also not very low since, according to Lobanov's bound [24] :
To resist fast algebraic attacks, a high algebraic immunity is not sufficient. If we can find g of low degree and h of algebraic degree not much larger than n/2 such that f g = h, then f is considered to be weak against fast algebraic attacks [10, 17] . The higher order nonlinearities of a function with high (fast) algebraic immunity is also not very low [3, 27, 40] .
The Walsh transform of a given function f ∈ B n is the integer-valued function over
where ω ∈ F n the nonlinearity of f can be determined by
The autocorrelation function of f ∈ B n is defined by
Also, f satisfies the strict avalanche criterion if C f (α) = 0, for wt(α) = 1. For convenience, we denote the largest odd m such that m ≤ n by d n , that is,
Cryptographic properties of the hidden weighted bit function
The hidden weighted bit function (HWBF) [2] in n-variables h ∈ B n is defined as follows:
We shall use h n if we need to emphasize the number of variables that h depends on.
If we let h ∈ B n be defined by
Let n = 4k + 1. Set x k+1 = x k+2 = . . . = x 2k = 0 and x 2k+1 = x 2k+2 = . . . = x 3k+1 = 1. Then the obtained subfunction from h n is the 2k-variable majority function, which has the optimum algebraic immunity k (see [13] ).
Theorem 1.
The HWBF h is balanced and has algebraic degree n − 1 (optimum for a balanced function), for n ≥ 3.
Proof. Clearly,
and the first claim is proven. We know (see e.g. [4, 12] ) that the coefficient of a monomial
We deduce that the coefficient of the monomial
. In particular, for k = n−1, the coefficient equals 1, for n ≥ 3. Hence, deg(h) = n−1.
Theorem 2. The HWBF h satisfies the strict avalanche criterion.
Proof. We need to prove that h(x)+h(x+α) is balanced, for α = (α 1 , . . . , α n ), wt(α) = 1, say α k = 1, where 1 ≤ k ≤ n. Since h(x) and h(x + α) are both balanced, it is sufficient to prove that
Clearly, if x k = 1 then wt(x + α) = wt(x) − 1 and if x k = 0 then wt(x + α) = wt(x) + 1. Hence, separating the cases wt(x) = i < k, i = k, i = k + 1 and i > k + 1, we have
(since if i = k, k + 1 for instance, then wt(x) = i and wt(x + α) = i + 1)
and, separating the cases
, and the result follows.
, and the bound is tight.
Proof. Let 1 ≤ k ≤ n and ω k = 1. We have
Since |{x| wt(x) = i and
and the result follows.
{x| wt(x) = i and
where A i = {x| wt(x) = i and
We use the convention that
Therefore, we have
where
It is easy to verify that S k = S n−k and S k decreases initially and then increases. That is, S k achieves the maximum value when k = 1 and achieves the minimum value when k = n 2 . Hence, by Lemma 1,
Therefore,
Proof. We have
Proof. By Lemmas 1-3 we have
Remark 1. For n odd,
which is exactly Lobanov's bound on the nonlinearity for n-variable functions with optimum algebraic immunity (albeit the HWBF function does not have optimal algebraic immunity).
Algebraic immunity
The algebraic immunity of the HWBF is a non-decreasing sequence of n. To prove this, let us first recall a known result:
Lemma 4 (Proposition 1 of [6] ). Let f , g be two Boolean functions in the variables x 1 , . . . , x n with AI(f ) = AI(g) = d, and let h = (1 +
Note that we know also from [6] that AI(h) = d if and only if there exists
and deg(f 1 +g 1 ) ≤ d−1, but we shall not need to use it here. Clearly, AI(h n ) = AI(h n ). Lemma 4 immediately implies the next result.
We next bound the algebraic immunity from below.
We first assume that (h + 1) · g = 0. Let
Then g(x) = 0, for any x such that h(x) = 0. We denote a ∅ by a 0 and a {i1,...,i k } by a i1i2...i k . 8
Since g(0, . . . , 0) = 0, we have a 0 = 0. Since g(0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) = 0 then a 2 = 0. Similarly, we have a 3 = . . . = a n = 0. Since g (0, 0, 1, 1, 0, . . . , 0) = 0 then a 34 = 0. Similarly, we have a 35 = . . . = a n−1,n = 0.
In general, let wt(x) = i, x 1 = x 2 = . . . = x i = 0 and x s1 = x s2 = . . . = x si = 1, where i + 1 ≤ s 1 < s 2 < . . . < s i ≤ n. Then h(x) = x i = 0. Therefore, g(x) = 0; moreover, g(y) = 0 for every y x; then a s1,s2,...,si = 0. Hence, we obtain g(x) = a 1 x 1 + a 12 x 1 x 2 + · · · + a 1n x 1 x n + a 23 x 2 x 3 + · · · + a 2n x 2 x n (i.e. the degree 2 terms containing x 1 or x 2 ) + a 123 x 1 x 2 x 3 + · · · + a 3,n−1,n x 3 x n−1 x n (i.e. the degree 3 terms containing x 1 , x 2 , or x 3 )
(i.e. the degree n terms containing x 1 , or x 2 , . . . , or x d )
The following Claims 2-4 will prove that all these coefficients of g must be 0. In the proof, the following Claim 1 will be frequently used.
Claim 1: For k ≥ 1; i > k and i + 1 ≤ s 1 < s 2 < . . . < s i−1 ≤ n, we have
In particular, a 13 = . . . = a 1n = a 134 = . . . = a 1,n−d+2,...,n = a 1 . Proof: Since g(1, 0, 1, 0, . . . 0) = 0, we have a 13 = a 1 . Similarly, a 14 = . . . = a 1n = a 1 . In general, let wt(x) = i > 1, x 1 = x s1 = x s2 = . . . = x si−1 = 1, where i + 1 ≤ s 1 < s 2 < . . . < s i−1 ≤ n. Then h(x) = x i = 0. Therefore, g(x) = 0 and by induction, a 1,s1,s2,...,si−1 = a 1 + a 1,s1 + · · · + a 1,si−1 + a 1,s1,s2 + · · · + a 1,si−2,si−1 + · · · + a 1,s2,...,si−1 = a 1 + a 1 + · · · + a 1 = a 1 , since i−1 0 1, 0, 1, 1, 0 , . . . , 0). Then h(x) = x 3 = 0. Therefore, g(x) = 0 and a 245 = a 24 + a 25 . In general, let wt(x) = i > 2, x 2 = x s1 = x s2 = . . . = x si−1 = 1, where i + 1 ≤ s 1 < s 2 < . . . < s i−1 ≤ n. Then h(x) = x i = 0. Therefore, g(x) = 0 and by induction, a 2,s1,s2,...,si−1 = a 2,s1 +a 2,s2 +· · ·+a 2,si−1 +a 2,s1,s2 +· · ·+a 2,si−2,si−1 +· · ·+a 2,s2,...,si−1 = a 2,s1 + · · · + a 2,si−1 , since a 2,s1,s2,...,sj + · · · + a 2,si−j ,...,si−1 = i−2 j−1 (a 2,s1 + · · · + a 2,si−1 ) and
Therefore, g(x) = 0 and by induction the claim follows.
Claim 2:
Proof: For k = 1, consider x = (1, 0, . . . , 0, 1 . . . , 1) such that wt(x) = d + 1 and x n−d+1 = . . . = x n = 1. Since d = n weight d + 1. Clearly, h(x) = 0 at these two points. Then g(x) = 0, and by Claim 1 we have a 2,n−d+1 + · · · + a 2,n = a 2,n−d + · · · + a 2,n−1 . That is, a 2,n−d = a 2,n . Similarly, we have a 2,d+1 = a 2,d+2 = . . . = a 2,n . Let d < w ≤ n and w − 1 be odd. Consider a point (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) of weight w satisfying x 2 = 1, x w = 0 and x t1 = x t2 = . . . = x tw−1 = 1, where d + 1 ≤ t 1 < t 2 < . . . < t w−1 ≤ n. Then g(x 1 , . . . , x n ) = 0 and a 2,t1 = 0. For 2 < k ≤ d, consider all those points (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) of weight d + 1 satisfying x k = 1 and x t1 = x t2 = . . . = x t d = 1, where n − 2d + 2 ≤ t 1 < t 2 < . . . < t d ≤ n. Clearly, h(x) = 0 at all these points, since d + 1 < n − 2d + 2 (i.e. 3d ≤ n). Therefore, g(x) = 0 and we get a system of equations. Then by Claim 1 we have a k,n−2d+2,n−2d+3,...,n−2d+k = . . . = a k,n−k+2,n−k+3,...,n (in fact, we get a system of variables. It is easy to verify that the system has at most two solutions (0, 0, . . . , 0) and (1, 1, . . . , 1)). Then we can deduce easily that a k,d+1,...,d+k−1 = . . . = a k,n−k+2,n−k+3,...,n . Let d ≤ w < n and w−1 k−1 be odd. Consider a point (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) of weight w satisfying x k = 1, x w = 0 and x t1 = x t2 = . . . = x tw−1 = 1, where d+1 ≤ t 1 < t 2 < . . . < t w−1 ≤ n. Then g(x 1 , . . . , x n ) = 0 and a k,t1,t2,...,t k−1 = 0, and the claim follows.
Claim 3: For 2 ≤ k ≤ d and r < k, we have a r,k,s1,...,s k−2 = a r,k = 0, where 0 and by induction, a 1,...,u+1 + a 1,. ..,u+1,n−d+u+1 + · · · + a 1,...,u+1,n + a 1,...,u+1,n−d+u+1,n−d+u+2 + · · · + a 1,...,u+1,n−d+u+2,...,n = a 1,...,u+1 + a 1,...,u+1 + . . . + a 1,...,u+1 = a 1,...,u+1 = 0. For u + 1 < k ≤ d, similar to the proof of Claim 2, we can deduce the result.
Therefore, for u + 1 ≤ k ≤ d and 0 < r 1 < . . . < r u < k, we have a r1,...,ru,k,s1,...,si = 0, where i ≥ k − u − 1 and d + 1 ≤ s 1 < s 2 < . . . < s i ≤ n. That is, g = 0 and h + 1 has no annihilator of degree at most d. Now consider h · g = 0. Leth(x 1 , . . . , x n ) = h(x 1 + 1, x 2 + 1, . . . , x n + 1). It is easy to verify thath(x 1 , . . . , x n ) = h(x n−1 , x n−2 , . . . , x 1 , x n ) + 1. By the above proof, 10 h(x 1 , . . . , x n ) has no annihilator of degree at most d. Therefore, h(x 1 , . . . , x n ) has no annihilator of degree at most d, and the result follows.
In Table 1 , we give the exact algebraic immunity of the n-variable HWBF, for 6 ≤ n ≤ 15.
Next, we investigate the normality of the HWBF.
Theorem 5. The HWBF h ∈ B n is a Resistance to fast algebraic attacks. Let deg(g 1 ) = d < AI(h) and h · g 1 = g 2 . We expect that deg(g 2 ) is as high as possible for any g 1 of low degree. The optimum case for a Boolean function to resist fast algebraic attacks is that deg(g 1 ) + deg(g 2 ) ≥ n for any g 1 of degree less than AI(h). Let deg(g 2 ) = e. For 6 ≤ n ≤ 13, in Table 2 , we give the lowest possible values of (d, e), which seems to be quite acceptable.
There are some other variants of algebraic attacks. In [39] , the authors introduced the higher order algebraic attack, with applications towards cryptanalysis of CarletFeng functions and rotation symmetric Boolean functions. However, those attacks do not work, since in practice the number of variables of the filter function is much less than the length of the LFSR. In [15] , algebraic attacks on the augmented function are introduced, which are dependant on low-degree conditional equations. Given a Boolean function with a large number of variables and good algebraic immunity, it is hard to find a low-degree equation. Therefore, higher order algebraic attacks and algebraic attacks on the augmented function can not pose a security threat to the HWBF. Summary of the features of the function:. While the HWBF is as simple as a symmetric function (in the sense that the complexity of computing the output of HWBF is almost as low as for a symmetric function), its BDD size is considerably higher, which has an interest for cryptography. Symmetric functions are considered dangerous by the cryptographic community, since an attacker could, in theory, use the symmetry property. In fact, an n variable symmetric Boolean function has a BDD of size O(n 2 ) [19] , and therefore is weak against BDD-based attacks. Moreover, many symmetric functions are not balanced and there is no even-variable balanced symmetric function with optimum algebraic immunity for n ≥ 4. The nonlinearity of the HWBF is similar to that of a symmetric function with optimum algebraic immunity. It does not have the weakness of a symmetric function but it has the same nice quality of being efficiently implementable in hardware, which allows taking n much larger, thus increasing the strength of its cryptographic properties.
Comparing with a randomly selected balanced Boolean function, the algebraic immunity and nonlinearity of this function may be low. In fact, when n = 10, AI(h) = 4 and nl(h) = 372. We can generate 128 pseudo random different integers between 1 and 256 and get a Boolean function whose truth table has the value 1 in these 128 positions. Using this method, we generated 64 randomly selected balanced Boolean functions. All these functions have the optimum algebraic immunity 5 and their nonlinearities are between 442 and 466. Algebraic immunity and nonlinearity of the first 12 generated functions can be found in Table 3 . It is known that most of Boolean functions have almost optimal algebraic immunity and a nonlinearity close to 2 n−1 − 2 n/2−1 √ 2n ln 2 [32] , for n large enough. As a comparison, the nonlinearity of HWBF is only around 2 n−1 − 2 n−1 2 πn , quite far away from that number.
For the same number of variables n, the algebraic immunity and nonlinearity of the HWBF are certainly lower than for other optimal functions, such as the Carlet-Feng function [7] . However, since the HWBF is very simple and can be implemented efficiently in hardware (which is the most important framework for us, since LFSR are better suited for hardware implementation), we can use the HWBF with many more variables. In fact, the time complexity of computing the output to the Carlet-Feng function is similar to the complexity of computing the discrete log, which requires exponential time when viewed asymptotically, e.g. using the index calculus method [9] , the time complexity is O(exp((1.587 + O(1))n 1/3 (ln n) 2/3 )), while the output of the HWBF can be computed only in linear time (in fact, the number of ones can even be counted in logarithmic time using the parallel algorithm [18] ). As for the space complexity, using Pohlig-Hellman method, the 20-variable Carlet-Feng function allows computing one output bit per cycle with more than 1000 half-adders and full-adders. In comparison, the 64-variable HWBF allows computing one output bit with only 2 6 − 1 = 63 half-adders and 2 6 − 6 − 1 = 57 full-adders [16] . Therefore, by the time and space complexity, we compare the 16-variable Carlet-Feng function with the 256-variable HWBF and give an example as follows. 12
Example 1: Let f c ∈ B 16 be the Carlet-Feng function discussed by [37] . Then deg(f c ) = 15, AI(f c ) = 8 and nl(f c ) = 32530. Let h = h 256 + x 257 x 258 + x 259 x 260 + x 261 x 262 + x 263 x 264 + x 265 x 266 + x 267 x 268 + x 269 x 270 + x 271 x 272 (we take this function h, since its efficiency of the implementation is similar to that of h 256 , while it has better cryptographic properties). Then deg( h) = 255, AI( h) ≥ AI(h) ≥ 86 and nl( h) = 2 271 − 2 9 254 127 (it should be noted that the resistance to the fast algebraic attack of h is also better than that of h since if h * g 1 = g 2 , then h * g 1 = g 2 + (x 257 x 258 + x 259 x 260 + x 261 x 262 + x 263 x 264 + x 265 x 266 + x 267 x 268 + x 269 x 270 + x 271 x 272 ) * g 1 ). Recall that the fast correlation attack has an on-line complexity proportional to 1 2 , where = is the so-called bias [26] . The algebraic attack has an on-line complexity proportional to N ωAI(f ) , where N is the length of the register and ω ≈ 2.37 (see e.g. [17] ). Therefore, the bias of f c is = 0.0036, while the bias of h is = 0.0001. As for the algebraic attack, f c has an on-line complexity proportional to N 18.96 , while the algebraic attack on h has an on-line complexity proportional to N 203.82 . Moreover, for any ordering of variables, BDD( h) > 2 51 [19] , while BDD(f c ) < 2 15 . Therefore, the cryptographic properties of h are much better than those of f c .
Concerning the resistance to fast algebraic attacks, it is more difficult to make comparisons since the known algorithms do not allow investigating large enough values of n; however, it seems most probable that the HWBF function in a large number of variables allows better resistance than the other known functions with good algebraic immunity.
Conclusion
This paper investigates some cryptographic properties of the HWBF. To summarize, the HWBF is balanced, has optimum algebraic degree and satisfies strict avalanche criterion. The algebraic immunity is at least n 3 + 1. The function seems to have quite acceptable behavior against fast algebraic attacks, as can be checked for small values of n. It also has a high BDD size. Since the HWBF can be implemented very efficiently, it can be used with a number of variables much larger than the other known functions with good algebraic immunity; this allows reaching very good cryptographic properties implying high resistance of the stream ciphers using it as a filter to the main attacks, and in the same time high speed of these ciphers. The HWBF is therefore a very good candidate for being used in the design of stream ciphers; indeed, very few functions have been found so far which can allow resistance to all the main known attacks, and except this one, none of them is very efficiently implementable.
